Rule Utilitarian and Deontologist Perspectives on Comparisons of Torture and Killing by Buha, Mark J.
Washington University Jurisprudence Review
Volume 2 | Issue 2
2010
Rule Utilitarian and Deontologist Perspectives on
Comparisons of Torture and Killing
Mark J. Buha
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Washington University Jurisprudence Review by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information,
please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mark J. Buha, Rule Utilitarian and Deontologist Perspectives on Comparisons of Torture and Killing, 2 Wash. U. Jur. Rev. 304 (2010).
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol2/iss2/5
RULE UTILITARIAN AND DEONTOLOGIST 
PERSPECTIVES ON COMPARISONS OF 
TORTURE AND KILLING 
MARK J. BUHA 
International law,' multiple treaties,2 and every state officially 
prohibit torture under all circumstances.3 Following decades of 
near agreement, however, the debate on torture was resurrected. 
The events of September 11, 2001 and other acts of terrorism 
prompted many to doubt the wisdom of a total ban on 
interrogational torture.4 The United States entered an 
unconventional war that demanded unconventional tactics.5 When 
fighting an enemy that lacks comparable resources and destructive 
power, information often becomes more important than gaining 
territory or destroying the enemy, soldier by soldier. Torture 
supposedly forces the suspect to divulge information that could 
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, Washington University School of Law. 
'See e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980) ("Having 
examined the sources from which customary international law is derived—the 
usage of nations, judicial opinions and works of jurists—we conclude that 
official torture is now prohibited by the law of nations."). 
2 See e.g., United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 2(2), Dec. 10, 1984, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 ("No exceptional 
circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, 
international political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked 
as a justification of torture."). As of May 2010, 146 countries have ratified the 
treaty. 
3Despite official prohibition, torture remains widespread. According to a 2004 
Amnesty International report, in 2003 at least 132 countries reported torture. 
Amnesty International Report 2004 Statistics Covering January to December 
2003, available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/erillibrary/asset/POL10/015/2004/en/5566f0b9-d5d6-  
11dd-bb24-lfb85fe8fa05/poll00152004en.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2010). See 
generally ROBERT B. EDGERTON, THE WORLDWIDE PRACTICE OF TORTURE 
(2007); Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 
YALE L.J. 1935 (2002) (showing that nations that sign treaties forbidding torture 
are no less likely to torture). 
I confine my analysis to interrogational torture: torture used as a technique to 
gather intelligence. Torture may also be used to gain sadistic pleasure, punish 
the victim, extract confessions, or terrorize an enemy group into submission. For 
a discussion of other purposes of torture, see David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, 
and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1429-40 (2005). 
5 For an excellent discussion on the moral dilemmas of unconventional warfare, 
see MICHAEL L. GROSS, MORAL DILEMMAS OF MODERN WAR (2010). 
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save innocent lives. Given the potential value of torture militarily, 
scholars and politicians have crafted various arguments to justify 
torture legally and morally.6 Among these arguments,7 one asks 
why we fear permitting torture in designated circumstances when 
many legal regimes openly permit certain forms of killing.8 
Although often unexamined, the argument raises a good point: 
what exactly makes torture unconditionally prohibited, while 
practices that inflict greater physical harm remain fixtures in many 
jurisdictions? Three forms of killing are currently legal. First, 
international law and nearly every moral theorist recognize some 
version of a "just war." Second, several states impose capital 
punishment. Third, many jurisdictions allow law enforcement to 
use deadly force against fleeing suspects of dangerous crimes. 
Each of these practices involves legal killing. How, then, does one 
justify a regime that simultaneously bans torture and authorizes 
these killings? 
In this Note, I provide potential replies for two important 
groups that support a universal prohibition of torture. Each arrives 
at the same conclusion by using different modes of analysis. 
Consequently, both groups must overcome different obstacles to 
distinguish torture and legal killing. Ultimately, both groups 
successfully defend their point. 
In Section I, I describe the argument that torture should be 
permitted because it results in less physical harm than legal killing. 
However repulsive the practice may be, torture usually leaves the 
victim alive to see another day. If killing is sometimes permissible, 
analogical reasoning suggests that torture ought to be sometimes 
6 See e.g., Mirko Bagaric & Julie Clarke, Not Enough Official Torture in the 
World? The Circumstances in Which Torture Is Morally Justifiable, 39 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 581 (2005); Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Should Coercive 
Interrogation Be Legal?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 671 (2006). 
7 To avoid unnecessary complexity, I choose to ignore the dimension of the 
debate that focuses on what acts constitute torture. Many scholars and politicians 
capitalize on the inherent difficulties of defining torture to distinguish it from 
other coercive techniques, reasoning that forms of ill-treatment short of torture 
are perfectly legal. See e.g., Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant 
Attorney Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. 
Haynes II., Gen Counsel of the Dep't of Def. 4-10 (Jan. 22, 2002), available at 
http://www.tomjoad.org/bybeememo.htm. For a thorough review of definitional 
issues, see GAIL MILLER, DEFINING TORTURE (2005). 
8See, e.g., Alex Bellamy, No Pain, No Gain? Torture and Ethics in the War on 
Terror, 82 INT'L AFF. 121, 129 (2006); Sanford Levinson, "Precommitment" 
and "Postcommitment": The Ban on Torture in the Wake of September 11, 81 
TEX. L. REV. 2013, 2034-37 (2003); David Sussman, What's Wrong with 
Torture?, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 1, 3 (2005); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, 
at 100. 
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permissible as well. From this comparison, many conclude that the 
law ought to allow officials to torture to prevent imminent 
catastrophes. This argument can be dissected into a six-step 
syllogism. It makes two claims and one important assumption. 
In Section II, I present rule utilitarianism's reply to this 
argument. I describe how rule utilitarians analyze morality. Rule 
utilitarians conclude that torture must be banned unconditionally 
for two reasons. First, the benefits of allowing some torture are 
marginal and uncertain, while the costs are substantial, given the 
distinct likelihood of unnecessary torture. Second, allowing some 
torture might drive a slippery slope to torture in less justifiable 
circumstances. But why are rule utilitarians not similarly 
concerned about unnecessary killings and a slippery slope to more 
killing? What makes torture so different that it requires a universal 
ban? 
Numerous inherent epistemic barriers and conceptual obstacles 
distinguish torture and killing. First, to interpret the preconditions 
for torture correctly, officials must overcome the modal problem of 
distinguishing possible dangers and actual threats, and then 
overcome—conceptual vagueness in the terms "imminence" and 
"catastrophe." Second, our inability to distinguish false and 
truthful disclosures of subjects causes the infliction of unnecessary 
pain. Third, conceptual vagueness in the term "suspect," only 
exacerbated by the frustration of war, makes torture more 
susceptible to the slippery slope. Finally, because prohibition of 
torture epitomizes the legal archetype of non-brutality, legalizing 
torture has a unique ability to affect other laws. 
In Section III, I provide deontology's reply to the objection. I 
describe how deontologists analyze morality and how their 
analysis differs from rule utilitarianism. Deontologists forbid 
torture under all circumstances because it violates the victim's 
rights. Such doctrinal rigidity attracts much criticism, particularly 
in the face of catastrophic danger, but deontologists effectively 
expose the weaknesses of these criticisms. Responding to 
analogies to legal killings, deontologists present two arguments. 
First, the objection contains a hidden premise that deontologists 
reject, ultimately dismantling the syllogism. Second, using the 
moral criteria deontologists accept, torture and the state-sanctioned 
killings can be distinguished. Torture attacks the defenseless and 
specifically targets human dignity. 
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I. THE OBJECTION 
Although killing imposes a greater physical harm, the law 
provides stronger protections against torture. After all, torture 
victims usually survive. And the law prohibits torture 
unconditionally, yet allows killing under certain conditions. Many 
reject this apparent disconnect and conclude that, like killing, some 
circumstances warrant legal torture. Henry Shue famously 
articulated this argument's syllogism in comparing torture and just-
war killings: 
A. Since (1) just-combat killing is total destruction 
of a person, 
(2) torture is—usually--only partial 
destruction or temporary incapacitation 
of a person, and 
(3) the total destruction of a person is a 
greater harm than the partial destruction 
of a person is, 
then (4) just-combat killing is a greater harm 
than torture usually is. 
B. Since (4) just-combat killing is a greater harm 
than torture usually is, and 
	
(5) 	 just-combat killing is sometimes 
morally permissible, 
	
then (6) 	 torture is sometimes morally 
permissible.9 
This argument makes two claims and commits one important 
assumption. The conclusion to stage A—step 4—states that killing 
someone in combat does more harm to him than torturing him.'" 
The conclusion to stage B—step 6—makes a moral claim: torture 
should be permissible at least sometimes. Significantly, stage B of 
the syllogism commits an important assumption that leaves space 
for challenges. The hidden premise is that "whenever a greater 
harm is permissible, a lesser harm must also be permissible." It 
assumes that the only consideration relevant to moral 
permissibility is the quantum of harm inflicted." In other words, 
comparing the morality of two acts involves weighing only the 
9 Henry Shue, Torture, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 124, 125-26 (1978) [hereinafter 
Shue, Torture]. 
i° While it is difficult to contest the reasoning that killing causes more harm than 
torture, some consider intense physical suffering worse than death. The practice 
of euthanasia demonstrates this preference among some individuals. 
I I Shue, Torture, supra note 9, at 126. 
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intensity of harms visited upon the victim; it disregards all other 
possible moral criteria. 
Rule utilitarians and deontologists must respond to this 
challenge under the terms of their respective moral theories. In the 
final analysis, they can defend themselves to varying degrees 
against comparisons to legal killings. I will now present these 
positions on torture and how each would individually respond to 
the objection. 
II. RULE UTILITARIANISM AND ITS REPLY 
A. Rule Utilitarianism and Torture 
Utilitarians assess the moral status of actions using the criteria 
of pleasure and pain.I2 Morally superior choices produce more 
pleasure and less pain than their alternatives. Act utilitarians focus 
on individual choices and evaluate whether particular actions 
maximize happiness.I3 Consequently, act utilitarians occasionally 
advocate breaking rules when the particular action maximizes 
happiness. By contrast, rule utilitarians attempt to maximize 
happiness by devising rules that must be followed universally.I4 
Although violating a rule might produce better consequences in 
specific instances, rule utilitarians argue that maintaining the 
integrity of the rule outweighs whatever benefits result from 
defying rules in exceptional circumstances.15 When confronting a 
particular moral dilemma, rule utilitarians resolve it simply by 
applying the rule, rather than re-engaging in utilitarian calculation 
before every act.16 Relying on this analysis, rule utilitarians 
12 Although often lumped together, utilitarianism and consequentialism are 
conceptually distinct. Utilitarianism represents a subset of consequentialist 
theories. Consequentialist theories weigh the state of affairs that actions yield. 
Utilitarianism, however, focuses only on pleasure, seeking to maximize the 
personal utilities of the state. Other consequentialist approaches are available, 
such as evaluating states by the utility of the worst-off individual. 
Consequentialist theories may even include states of obedience to moral norms 
and non-violation of duties in their calculus. See Amartya Sen, Rights and 
Agency, 11 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1982); Michael S. Moore, Torture and the 
Balance of Evils, 23 ISR. L. REV. 280 (1989). 
13 See RICHARD MATTHEWS, THE ABSOLUTE VIOLATION: WHY TORTURE MUST 
BE PROHIBITED 103 (2008). 
14 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 680. 
15 MATTHEWS, supra note 13, at 105. 
16 Moore, supra note 12, at 295. 
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supporting universal prohibition of torture have determined that the 
net costs of permitting some torture outweigh the net benefits." 
Posner and Vermeule argue that the debate' 8 between act and 
rule utilitarians is reduced to determining whether a legal standard 
or rule produces the best result.°  A legal standard that permits 
torture in designated circumstances might prevent a catastrophe if 
officials correctly identify those circumstances and conduct the 
torture effectively, forcing the subject to disclose information 
needed to extinguish an imminent threat. However, this legal 
standard carries a substantial risk that officials will erroneously 
interpret the standard and torture unnecessarily. On the other hand, 
a black-letter legal rule forbidding torture avoids the risk of 
needless torture, but loses the benefits of torture in exigent 
circumstances. In weighing these opportunity costs, rule 
utilitarians find the black-letter rule morally superior. 
But how could a utilitarian endorse a law that bans torture 
unconditionally? After all, torture harms only an individual and 
might produce information that could save millions of innocent 
lives. Rule utilitarians offer two reasons why a black-letter legal 
rule is superior to a more flexible legal standard. First, the benefits 
of a flexible standard are marginal and doubtful, while the costs are 
substantial, given the distinct likelihood of unnecessary torture. 
Second, a standard allowing some torture might drive a slippery 
slope to more torture. 
1. Rule Utilitarian Arguments Against Torture 
First, a legal standard allowing some torture invites grave costs 
and yields only marginal and uncertain benefits. Unnecessary 
torture—the deliberate infliction of enormous pain without any 
return—is no small cost for a utilitarian. Rule utilitarians 
emphasize how often this would occur. For torture to be necessary 
and effective, officials must make a series of correct judgments 
17 See, e.g., Sherry Colb, Why Is Torture "Different" and How "Different" Is 
It?, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1411, 1421 (2009); Oren Gross, Are Torture Warrants 
Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and Official Disobedience, 88 MJNN. L. REV. 
1481, 1496 (2004). 
18 I confine my analysis to whether act or rule utilitarianism produces the best 
result, rather than between groups of rule utilitarians. Because hardly any rule 
utilitarians advocate a rule obligating torture in all circumstances, the more 
appropriate analysis becomes whether our legal system should permit some 
torture in exceptional circumstances or no torture at all. 
19 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6. Note that Posner and Vermeule ultimately 
conclude, however, that a legal standard—permitting torture in some 
circumstances—ultimately produces the best result. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol2/iss2/5
without lengthy investigation. Officials must correctly determine 
that (1) an actual terrorist threat exists, (2) the threat is imminent, 
(3) the threat is sufficiently dangerous to justify torture, (4) the 
suspect possesses information necessary to extinguish the threat, 
(5) torture will be effective in forcing the victim to disclose 
information,20 (6) any information disclosed will be reliable, and 
(7) the torturer will be able to differentiate truthful and false 
information, if disclosed at all. If any of these seven determinations 
prove incorrect, officials tortured unnecessarily. Officials must 
make these determinations quickly, often without any opportunity 
to find corroborating information. They must blindly guess 
whether a particular suspect possesses reliable information and will 
divulge it through torture. Even if the suspect discloses 
information, any contingency plans established by a terrorist 
organization that alters its attack following a member's capture 
would render the information useless.21 In short, a legal standard 
that allows some torture will likely cause much unnecessary 
torture, and unnecessary torture is a grave cost to utilitarians. 
Torture also yields only marginal benefits. One person rarely 
possesses all of the information necessary to prevent an imminent 
catastrophe.22 It is much more likely that each individual captured 
and tortured will only be able to reveal a fragment of a complicated 
puzzle, if anything at al1.23 Because officials acquire information 
from torture in piecemeal, the opportunity for unnecessary torture 
multiplies exponentially. Moreover, to obtain any real benefit from 
torture, the quantity and quality of information acquired from 
torture must exceed the quantity and quality of information 
acquired from alternative investigative methods. If the same 
information could be acquired by less costly means, why torture at 
all? Why inflict enormous pain—a great moral cost to 
utilitarians—when equally effective means of obtaining 
information are available? Available alternatives include 
informants, spies, bribery, gaining the suspect's trust, planting 
recording devices, and hacking the enemy's computer system. 
20 One of the strongest arguments against permitting torture is that torture fails to 
produce reliable information in a timely manner. Many claim that torture is 
simply ineffective. Little evidence exists and we are forced to rely largely on 
anecdotal information. For a discussion on the effectiveness of torture, see 
Philip N.S. Rummy, Is Coercive Interrogation of Terrorist Suspects Effective? 
A Response to Bagaric and Clarke, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 479 (2006). 
21 GROSS, supra note 5, at 124. 
22 See id. at 125-26. 
23 Sophisticated military and criminal networks limit their exposure by 
withholding information from those in the lower rungs of the chain of command, 
revealing the complete plan to only a few select members. 
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Second, allowing some torture might drive us down a "slippery 
slope" to its use in less justifiable circumstances. Rule utilitarians 
assert four varieties of slippery slope arguments. First, a legal 
standard allowing some torture might lead to progressively more 
frequent use in combating terrorism. The argument asserts that 
permitting some torture shatters the taboo against it. The fear is 
that, with time, officials will develop a greater preparedness to 
torture, and torture will eventually become normalized, used more 
frequently, and embraced as a legitimate means to obtain 
information, rather than an exception reserved for catastrophic 
emergencies.24 Second, a legal standard permitting torture might 
lead to its use in achieving other security objectives. After all, if 
countering terrorism justifies torture, surely other objectives justify 
torture. Reasoning by analogy, lawmakers may allow torture in 
investigating the drug trade, kidnappings, or any other threat. 
Third, because the prohibition on torture serves special symbolic 
purposes, removing the ban on torture may affect other laws as 
wel1.25 If we suddenly lift the long-standing ban against torture, 
even if only for extraordinary circumstances, it signals diminished 
value for human dignity and the inviolability of the human body.26 
Finally, legalizing torture in the United States might spread 
legalization to other nations. Foreign leaders may reason that if the 
superpower United States cannot maintain security without 
committing torture, weaker and more embattled nations cannot be 
expected to defend themselves without torture.27 At the very least, 
members of terrorist organizations that the United States tortures 
will be justified in torturing captured citizens of the United States. 
Rule utilitarians provide both empirical and theoretical support 
for these slippery slope arguments. First, history presents 
numerous examples of nations legalizing some torture but 
eventually using it too frequently and with progressively weaker 
justifications.28 Second, rule utilitarians reason that the 
infrastructure necessary to maintain institutionalized torture 
contributes to its normalization.29 To properly assess the costs of a 
24 See, e.g., MATTHEWS, supra note 13, at 120-134. 
25 See Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White 
House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1718-39. 
26 Gross, supra note 17, at 1504-05; accord Waldron, supra note 25, at 1718-39. 
27 See, e.g., Henry Shue, Torture in Dreamland: Disposing of the Ticking Bomb, 
37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 231, 235 (2006). 
28 See, e.g., Matthew Lippman, The Protection of Universal Human Rights: The 
Problem of Torture, 1 UNIV. HUM. RTS. 25, 37 (1979); Luban, supra note 4, at 
1445-52. See generally EDGERTON, supra note 3. 
29See, e.g., MArmEws, supra note 13, at 120-34; Jean Maria Arrigo, A 
Utilitarian Argument Against Torture Interrogation of Terrorists, 10 Sc!. & 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol2/iss2/5
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particular regime, we must also assess the practices necessary for 
its implementation.3° For torture to serve its purposes, it must be 
effective.3I The state must perform extensive scientific research on 
how to force someone to disclose valued information through 
torment.32 Then, the state must train and maintain a stable of 
skilled torturers, requiring further research to determine how to 
train torturers.33 These institutions would require legal support and 
defense from public officials.34 In short, the costs of torture are not 
confined to the torture chambers and exist even if we torture only 
infrequently.35 Torture necessitates a surrounding institutional 
apparatus and ideological support structure that promotes its 
normalization. 
Beyond the two major arguments set forth above, rule 
utilitarians also list a number of other factors that weigh against 
permitting torture. First, legalizing torture degrades the reputation 
of the state in the international community. States that legalize 
torture lose the moral high ground against their enemies.36 Second, 
torture alienates and radicalizes the tortured population, 
particularly if misused.37 Third, torture affects the torturer: the 
torturer usually suffers severe psychological trauma.38  
2. Criticisms of Rule Utilitarian Arguments Against 
Torture 
Three major objections challenge the rule utilitarian position. 
First, rule utilitarians adopt an inherently unprincipled position.39 
On one hand, utilitarianism seeks to maximize happiness. On the 
other, rule utilitarians declare rules applicable in all circumstances, 
even in instances where happiness would not be maximized. When 
ENGINEERING ETHICS 543 (2004); Jessica Wolfendale, Training Torturers: A 
Critique of the "Ticking Bomb" Argument, 32 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 269 
(2006). 
30See, e.g., MATTHEWS, supra note 13, at 14; Arrigo, supra note 29, at 540. 
31 MATTHEWS, supra note 13, at 107. 
32 Id. at 122-27. 
33 k 
34 Id. 
35 Arrigo, supra note 29, at 564. 
36 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 693; accord Kenneth Lasson, Torture, 
Truth Serum, and Ticking Bombs: Toward a Pragmatic Perspective on Coercive 
Interrogation, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 329, 345 (2009). 
37 See e.g., MATTHEWS, supra note 13, at 134; Lippman, supra note 28, at 37; 
Sussman, supra note 8, at 12. 
38Lippman, supra note 28, at 37. 
39 See Moore, supra note 12, at 296. 
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faced with an anomaly like the ticking time bomb scenario, the rule 
utilitarian must abandon cost-benefit calculation and simply apply 
the predetermined rule. Such "rule worship,"4° in the supposed 
context of utilitarianism is inherently irrational and even 
contradictory. If purporting to employ an ethical theory based on 
cost-benefit analysis, a rule utilitarian should be able to deviate 
from predetermined rules in a ticking time bomb scenario. 
Second, rule utilitarianism's empirical arguments rely on 
factual realities that are capable of change.4 1 It is always possible 
that the world could change enough that rule utilitarians' position 
loses favor. The threat of terrorism may one day loom so great that 
the costs of unconditional prohibition outweigh the benefits, 
favoring a legal standard rather than a black-letter legal rule. 
Third, the slippery slope arguments asserted by rule utilitarians 
meet three objections. First, the slippery slope arguments lack 
empirical support. Proponents of a slippery slope argument have 
the burden of identifying the mechanism by which the initial policy 
choice leads to adverse consequences and providing empirical 
evidence suggesting this mechanism does, in fact, exist.42 Often, 
rule utilitarians fail to provide empirical support beyond mere 
speculation.43 The analogous state-sanctioned killings have not 
been driven down a slippery slope. There is no evidence of more 
wars, capital punishment, or killings of fleeing suspects.44 Warfare 
and capital punishment require an institutional and ideological 
support structure as vast as tortureyet these have not led to 
normalization. Second, slippery slopes can be avoided if we 
recognize when superficially similar positions are relevantly 
different.45 If we simply recognize the difference, allowing torture 
to stop an imminent attack will not lead to torture used to prevent 
unexceptional crimes. Third, legalizing and regulating torture 
might actually reduce the amount of torture rather than open the 
floodgates. Legalization forces public officials to be held 
40 Gross, supra note 17, at 1496. 
41 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 681. 
42 Id. at 688. See generally Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. 
REV. 361 (1985); Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 1026 (2003). 
43 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 689-90. 
" Id. 
45See Eric Lode, Comment: Slippery Slope Arguments and Legal Reasoning, 87 
CAL. L. REV. 1469, 1486-87 (1999). 
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accountable." When conducted illegally, as it is today, officials 
escape scrutiny.47  
B. Rule Utilitarianism's Reply 
Rule utilitarians thus offer two explanations for why a black-
letter legal rule forbidding torture is superior to a flexible standard 
that allows torture in designated circumstances. First, the benefits 
of a flexible standard are marginal and uncertain, while the costs 
are substantial, given the likelihood of unnecessary torture. 
Second, a standard allowing some torture might drive a slippery 
slope to more torture. But why do these same concerns not also 
persuade rule utilitarians to ban legal killing?" A flexible legal 
standard allows killing in designated circumstances. Unnecessary 
killing and a slippery slope to more killing are certainly possible. 
What is so special about torture that makes it more susceptible to 
unnecessary use and the slippery slope, and therefore amenable 
only to an unconditional ban? How are torture and legalized killing 
different? 
Rule utilitarians focus on the inherent conceptual difficulties 
that distinguish torture and killing. They offer two reasons for why 
torture is more likely to result in unnecessary pain and two reasons 
for why torture is more vulnerable to slippery slope problems. 
First, to interpret the preconditions for torture correctly, officials 
must overcome the modal problem of distinguishing possible 
dangers and actual threats and the problem of conceptual 
vagueness in the terms "imminence" and "catastrophe." Second, 
officials must inflict unnecessary pain because of their inability to 
distinguish false and truthful disclosures of subjects. Third, torture 
is more susceptible to the slippery slope because of conceptual 
vagueness in the term "suspect," which is only exacerbated by the 
tense circumstances surrounding war and the difficulty of 
identifying suspects who possess helpful information. Finally, 
because prohibition of torture epitomizes the legal archetype of 
" Alan Dershowitz, Torture Without Visibility and Accountability Is Worse 
Than With It, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 326 (2003). 
47 Alan Dershowitz, The Torture Warrant: A Response to Professor Strauss, 48 
N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 275, 283 (2004). 
48As an initial matter, rule utilitarians value the cost of death as greater than the 
pains of torture. Calculating the extent to which a rule utilitarian attributes a 
greater value meets certain epistemic barriers. For example, how do we compare 
pain and death? See MATTHEWS, supra note 13, at 109-13. Nevertheless, we may 
assume death is worse than torment, even if we cannot ascertain degree. 
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nonbrutality, legalizing torture has a unique ability to affect other 
laws. 
1. Preconditions for Torture and Legal Killing 
Inherent epistemic barriers obstruct interpretation of three 
common preconditions for torture: that the threat is real, imminent, 
and sufficiently dangerous. These conceptual difficulties 
complicate interpretation of any legal standard allowing some 
torture and make unnecessary torture much more likely, if not 
inevitable. No such complications plague interpretation of 
preconditions for legal killings, rendering a legal standard allowing 
killing in designated circumstances more justifiable. First, legal 
killings respond to past observable events, while torture responds 
to mere risks. Second, torture requires interpretation of vague 
terms, allowing greater opportunity for cautious intelligence 
agencies to broadly interpret the terms and torture unnecessarily. 
Interpretation of the preconditions for legalized killing affords 
fewer opportunities for error. 
First, officials face a modal problem in distinguishing potential 
and real threats.49 Threats are always possible until they 
materialize into harm. If officials could torture in response to any 
threat or danger, they could torture at all times. Assuming that we 
desire at least some limitations on the availability of torture as an 
investigative technique, we must distinguish merely possible 
dangers and real threats, and allow torture only in response to the 
latter. But how exactly do we identify a "real threat?" "Real threat" 
is an oxymoron "Threat" denotes potentiality and not actuality. 
Ultimately, identifying a "real threat" requires somehow 
differentiating between possibilities that have not yet occurred but 
would occur without intervention, and possibilities that will not 
occur. Officials contemplating torture must determine that an event 
yet to materialize will, in fact, materialize, a process more 
complicated than merely responding to observable events that have 
already occurred. These complications invite mistake, the cost of 
which is unnecessary torture. 
Moreover, officials rarely obtain just enough information to 
conclude that a bona fide threat exists, but not enough information 
to stop that threat without torture. If the information is robust 
enough to justify the assertion that the threat is real rather than 
merely possible, that information would also be sufficient to 
49 MATTHEWS, supra note 13, at 77-80. 
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extinguish the threat in the first place.5° The narrow window of 
information that justifies torture suggests how ineffective the 
practice is. 
The second and third preconditions for torture—that the threat 
is imminent and sufficiently large—are conceptually vague. 
Requiring imminence—that the "threat" will materialize soon, 
presumably before alternative measures can be taken—triggers the 
sorites paradox.51 Intuitively, we understand what imminence 
means, but reflection on the choice of determining what exactly 
qualifies as imminent (hour, day, week, month?) reveals the term 
"imminent" is hopelessly vague52 Attempts at line-drawing 
inevitably produce arbitrary results. Not only must "imminence" 
be defined arbitrarily, but interpreting whether a threat falls within 
that definition is nearly impossible. Even if officials agree on the 
meaning of "imminence," they face grave difficulties in 
determining whether a particular threat at hand might materialize 
within the defined timeframe. Riddled with these conceptual 
problems, it is doubtful that cautious intelligence agencies will 
limit torture to imminent threats.53 More likely, they will interpret 
the meaning of the precondition "imminence" too broadly. 
Likewise, any requirement specifying the nature and magnitude 
of the threat raises the same conceptual problems of arbitrariness 
and interpretation. A "catastrophe" might mean ten, a thousand, or 
a million lives. Once "catastrophe" is arbitrarily defined, officials 
encounter difficulties determining whether a particular threat meets 
that standard. They will likely err on the side of "caution," 
torturing when the threat is unjustifiably small. 
By contrast, decision-makers interpreting the preconditions for 
just war, capital punishment, and the killing of fleeing suspects 
face fewer inherent conceptual difficulties. First, legal killings 
respond to events that have already occurred, rather than fears of 
something that only may occur in the future. Wars follow attacks, 
executions follow murders, and fleeing suspect deaths follow 
dangerous crimes and attempted escapes. Torture, however, 
follows a determination that a perceived threat will soon become a 
catastrophe. Thus, torture requires interpretation of the possible 
5° See id. at 84; see also Wolfendale, supra note 29, at 271-72. 
51 The sorites paradox is a problem that arises from vague predicates. If one 
million grains of sand are a "heap," and a heap minus one grain is still a "heap," 
then repeated applications forces one to eventually accept that just one grain of 
sand is still a heap. Surely, just one grain is not a heap, so we must draw an 
arbitrary line. 
52See MATTHEWS, supra note 13, at 74-77. 
53 Id. at 75. 
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future while legal killings require interpretation of the past, and 
interpreting potentialities is often more difficult than interpreting 
past real events. 
Second, conceptual vagueness plagues interpretation of torture 
but not legalized killings. None of the preconditions for state-
sanctioned killings contain conceptual vagueness. Parties may 
dispute whether the defendant killed the victim or possessed the 
requisite intent defined by statute, but neither kill nor intent is 
vague. Law enforcement may accidentally shoot the wrong person 
when pursuing a fleeing suspect, but "fleeing" is not vague. We 
understand the terms, articulate principled definitions for them, and 
dispute only their application in particular cases. Interpreting the 
preconditions for torture requires arbitrarily defining the vague 
predicates "imminence" and "catastrophe," and then somehow 
determining from pieced-together information that a potential 
future event satisfies that definition. We do not understand the 
terms, cannot articulate principled definitions for them because of 
the sorites paradox,54 and dispute their application. 
2. Administration of Torture and Legal Killing 
Inherent epistemic obstacles prevent efficient administration of 
torture, but no such difficulties prevent efficient administration of 
state-sanctioned killings. Even if the three preconditions for 
torture—that the threat is real, imminent, and sufficiently 
dangerous—are satisfied and officials are justified in torturing 
suspects, interpretive barriers make unnecessary torture inevitable. 
Officials must inflict more pain than necessary to achieve their 
objectives. Inefficiency results from officials' inability to 
recognize reliable information once disclosed.55 Presumably, some 
suspects possess relevant information, and torture will effectively 
force them to divulge it. But common sense suggests that during 
torture, many terrorists—committed to their cause—deliberately 
give false information to mislead the torturer. Many more suspects 
simply do not possess any relevant information and will say 
anything to stop the torment. Although suspects may provide true 
or false information during torture, officials inherently cannot 
distinguish the two. 
Unable to discriminate between truthful and false disclosures, 
officials must inflict unnecessary pain in two ways. First, officials 
must torture more people than necessary. Even if the first suspect 
54 Supra note 51. 
55 MATTHEWS, supra note 13, at 87. 
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apprehended and tortured discloses all the information necessary to 
extinguish the threat, a very unlikely scenario, the torturer cannot 
know that for sure. The individual suspect cannot corroborate his 
admissions when tortured.56 The torturer, suspicious that he has 
received false information, needs to check the suspect's credibility 
before diverting valuable resources to act on the tip. To verify the 
information disclosed, officials need to torture at least one other 
person unnecessarily. Most likely, they need to torture dozens of 
additional suspects to receive matching information and gain 
enough confidence to act on the tip. 
Second, officials must torture each individual for an 
unnecessarily long period of time. The torturer never knows 
whether the victim disclosed all the information they possess. To 
ensure the victim admits everything known, the torturer needs to 
continue for at least a little longer after the suspect completes the 
admission. The need for trust, particularly in a situation that breeds 
intense suspicion, creates an inherent barrier to efficient torture.57 
A third reason that officials must inflict unnecessary pain is the 
failure to understand pain. Pain is a very complex phenomenon.58 
Tolerance to pain varies substantially between individuals. 
Individuals react very differently to the same stimuli. The intensity 
of injury inflicted bears no direct relationship to the intensity of 
pain experienced. We experience several types of pain that bear 
complicated relationships to each other. Somehow, torturers must 
overcome these difficulties to calculate how much pain, what type 
of pain, and the proper method of inflicting pain that will force 
each unique individual to divulge information. Given the myriad 
variables, it is nearly impossible to inflict just enough pain to 
compel the subject to disclose information but no more. More 
likely, torturers will adopt a one-size-fits-all approach, inflicting 
maximal pain to ensure that every individual reaches the breaking 
point. Unnecessary pain, a great moral cost to utilitarians, is nearly 
inevitable. 
By contrast, no such inherent epistemic barriers prevent 
efficient administration of state-sanctioned killings. To be sure, 
mistakes may occur, causing unnecessary death; in war and the 
killing of fleeing suspects, there may be collateral deaths, and in 
capital punishment, innocent individuals may be executed. But 
nothing necessitates inefficiency. Unnecessary deaths result from 
missing the target, erroneously interpreting the law, and applying 
56 Sussman, supra note 8, at 7-8. 
57 Id. 
58 For an excellent discussion on torture and pain, see DARNS REJALI, TORTURE 
AND DEMOCRACY 447-53 (2007). 
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the facts to the law incorrectly. Various controls limit potential for 
these errors. Assuming a just war, decision-makers purposefully 
formulate strategies that minimize collateral deaths. Juries, the 
appeals process, and executive pardon limit the potential for 
executing innocents. In either case, it is at least possible that the 
state inflicts no unnecessary pain. But the torturer, unable to 
distinguish between truthful and false disclosures from terrorists, 
must torture an unnecessary number of individuals for 
unnecessarily long periods to obtain corroboration. 
3. The Slippery Slope in Torture and Killing 
Conceptual difficulties and the tense circumstances 
surrounding torture make it especially vulnerable to the slippery 
slope. First, conceptual vagueness in the terms "terrorist" and 
"suspect" provide opportunity for broad interpretation.59 We 
intuitively understand what "terrorist" means, but attempts at 
defining which individuals qualify as terrorists produce arbitrary 
results. Is it only those who actually participate in attacks? Or do 
we extend the definition to those willing to participate, anyone 
providing shelter, couriers, political leaders, ideological supporters, 
journalists, financiers, etc.? °c' 
Second, officials charged with identifying individuals that meet 
the definitions for "terrorist" and "suspect" are likely to take 
advantage of opportunities for broad interpretation and torture 
more frequently with time. They are likely to do so for two 
reasons. First, they interpret these terms under stress from 
impending danger. °I Second, the inevitable racial and political 
connotations of the term "terrorist" create prejudices that 
encourage mistakes. Torturing only members of a certain class 
predisposes us to treating the entire class as less-than-human.62 
Especially when under pressure from threat of attack, these 
prejudices might make officials identify suspected terrorists 
progressively more liberally and select individuals solely by skin 
color or political affiliation. 
59 See MATTHEWS, supra note 13, at 88-94. 
60 Id. at 90-91. 
61 Frustration clouds judgment. Under threat of attack, we can reasonably expect 
decision-makers to become more desperate, less diligent in screening suspects, 
and more likely to needlessly torture. Because torture is presumably only 
committed during times of stress, when moral judgment gradually dissipates, 
allowing some torture invites slippery slope problems. 
62 Id. at 128. 
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Although just war killings and the killings of fleeing suspects 
are also committed in times of tension and danger, they are 
distinguishable from torture. A natural limitation controls fleeing 
suspect killings: these killings must follow dangerous crimes and 
therefore cannot occur more frequently unless dangerous crimes 
are committed more frequently. This precondition prevents 
slippery slope problems. 
Just wars admittedly face some of the same slippery slope 
problems as torture. Protracted and costly wars tend to become less 
"just" with time. Racial prejudices against the enemy population 
develop in war and may result in slippery slopes to more killings. 
But wartime killings and torture differ. In any conflict, soldiers 
must identify their opponents. In a designated battle, soldiers 
capture or kill opponent soldiers. In other forms of conflict, they 
capture or kill insurgents and terrorists, a more difficult task that 
requires interpretation and is therefore more prone to mistake, 
especially as prejudices develop. Even worse, identifying which 
individuals to torture—those possessing information regarding an 
upcoming attack—requires another layer of interpretation. Rather 
than merely distinguishing between enemy and non-enemy, 
soldiers must first recognize the enemy and then differentiate 
between them to ensure that they torture only enemies with 
knowledge of imminent attacks. Another layer of interpretation 
affords another opportunity for prejudice to progressively blur the 
lines.63  
4. Torture and Other Laws 
Jeremy Waldron argues that because of torture's significance in 
the law, legalizing it would affect other laws.64 He claims that the 
prohibition of torture is a legal archetype that epitomizes and 
expresses an important underlying principle of the law: "the law is 
not brutal in its operation."65 Waldron defines a legal archetype as 
a "particular provision in a system of norms which has a 
significance going beyond its immediate normative content, a 
significance stemming from the fact that it sums up or makes vivid 
to us the point, purpose, principle, or policy of a whole area of 
law."66 Prohibition of torture is archetypal of the policy that the 
law does not rule through fear and terror.67 As evidence, Waldron 
63 See GROSS, supra note 5, at 12. 
" Waldron, supra note 25, at 1718-39. 
65 Id. at 1726. 
66 Id. at 1723. 
67 Id. at 1726. 
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cites three areas of law that reference this principle of nonbrutality: 
the Eighth Amendment, procedural due process, and substantive 
due process.68 Undermining this legal archetype by permitting 
some torture, even if only in limited circumstances, unravels 
surrounding law that also embodies this principle of nonbrutality.69 
Waldron thus argues the reverse of a slippery slope. Rather than 
claiming that removing some lesser law makes it easier to remove 
more important laws, Waldron argues that lifting theyrohibition on 
torture makes it harder to defend the lesser laws. ' After all, if 
torture is permissible, how can we argue that flogging prisoners, 
coerced confessions, pumping someone's stomach to obtain 
narcotics evidence, or police brutality is wrong?7' 
III. DEONTOLOGY AND ITS REPLY 
A. Deontology and Torture 
Deontologists, like rule utilitarians, devise rules that must be 
followed universally. Deontologists and rule utilitarians differ only 
in what criteria they use to formulate these rules. Rule utilitarians 
use only pleasure and pain. They hold that any act that maximizes 
pleasure and minimizes pain when applied universally is good. 
Deontologists evaluate actions under an entirely different rubric 
than rule utilitarians,72 often focusing on the mental state of the 
actor or whether the act violates another's rights.73 If it violates 
another's rights, it is strictly forbidden, regardless of the 
consequences.74 Deontologists tend to treat each individual 
68 Id. at 1730-34. 
69 1d. at 1733-35. 
70 Id. at 1735. 
71 
 Id. 
72 There are many varieties of deontology, some more agent-centered and others 
victim-centered. To avoid unnecessary complexity and focus on comparing 
torture and legal killings, I choose to ignore the differences within deontology. 
73 See e.g., MATTHEWS, supra note 13, at 144; Moore, supra note 12, at 297; 
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 676; see also Christopher Kutz, Torture, 
Necessity, and Existential Politics, 95 CAL. L. REV. 235, 255-57 (2007). 
74 Note that deontologists generally do not ignore consequences. They simply 
hold that consequences remain subordinate to the highest good. Deontology 
merely sets limits to consequentialist reasoning. MATTHEWS, supra note 13, at 
12; Mon Harel & Assaf Sharon, What is Really Wrong with Torture, 6 J. INT'L 
CRIM. JUST. 241, 245-48 (2008). Matthews reasons that Immanuel Kant's rule is 
that we should never act in a way in which we would not want everyone to act, 
no one desires a universal law that ignores consequences, and therefore 
deontology does not ignore consequences. MA1THEWS, supra note 13, at 12. 
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separately as an end in itself.75 Applying this analysis, many 
deontologists forbid torture under all circumstances.? 
	 see 
torture as a particularly repugnant violation of individual rights. It 
requires specific intent, deprives the victim of dignity, and invades 
the victim's physical and psychological integrity. 
Provided grave enough consequences, this uncompromising 
position represents a fanaticism77 and "moral fundamentalism"' 
that is difficult to defend. Hardly anyone finds it acceptable to 
rigidly adhere to an abstract moral principle—no matter how sound 
the principle appears in isolation—when doing so results in the 
death of hundreds or thousands of people.79 Deontologists allow 
catastrophe and mass death to occur to protect a single individual 
simply because torture violates his or her rights. 
The infamous "ticking time bomb" hypothetical illuminates 
these objections. In this scenario, a bomb is located in a crowded 
city. If detonated, it will destroy the entire city and millions will 
die. The bomb's location is unknown, and there is not enough time 
for a general search. Law enforcement apprehends one of the 
bomb's planters who knows the bomb's location and how to de-
activate it. If the terrorist divulges the information, law 
enforcement has enough time to disable the bomb. Given these 
facts, few would adhere to principle; most would torture the 
individual in order to extract information that would save millions. 
This hypothetical presses deontology to its ideological limits. Once 
the prohibitionist admits he would allow torture in this situation, he 
concedes that his opposition to torture is not based on principle 
alone, but on something else.8°  
Deontologists respond with both logical and empirical 
objections to the ticking time bomb hypothetical's seductive 
simplicity. First, as Richard Matthews points out, the argument 
may be valid, but it is unsound, and therefore it cannot seriously 
undermine any position on torture.81 The ticking bomb argument 
sets forth an "if-then" conditional: if these facts exist, then a 
reasonable person would torture.82 If the antecedent holds, the 
consequence follows. But the hypothetical assumes the 
75 See e.g., Harel & Sharon, supra note 74, at 247; Kutz, supra note 73, at 257. 
76 See e.g., Colb, supra note 17, at 1420; Gross, supra note 17, at 1492-93; 
Luban, supra note 4, at 1430; Moore, supra note 12, at 297-98. 
77 Gross, supra note 17, at 1517; Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 676. 
78 Harel & Sharon, supra note 75, at 246. 
79 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 676-77. 
Luban, supra note 4, at 1430. 
81 See MATTHEWS, supra note 13, at 71. 
82 MATTHEWS, supra note 13, at 13-14. 
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antecedent's truth without providing any proof. Valid but not 
sound, the hypothetical proves nothing. If we accepted mere 
validity, anything could be proven.83 
Second, deontologists point out how unlikely it is that the 
antecedent facts would ever simultaneously exist in the real world. 
Although each premise has an empirical likelihood of being false, 
the hypothetical assumes that (1) an actual terrorist threat exists, 
(2) the threat is imminent, (3) the threat is sufficiently dangerous to 
justify torture, (4) the apprehended suspect possesses any 
information relevant to the threat, (5) only a single individual 
possesses all of the information necessary to extinguish the threat, 
(6) the individual participated in the attack or is a wrongdoer, (7) 
torture will be effective in forcing the subject to disclose 
information, (8) the information disclosed is truthful, and (9) the 
torturer can distinguish truthful and false information simply by 
observing the subject. The distinct unlikelihood that all nine 
elements will simultaneously exist in the real world renders the 
example almost irrelevant, useful only as a thought exercise.84 
While these criticisms expose the assumptions in the ticking 
time bomb hypothetical, they ultimately avoid the issue. While it 
might be extremely unlikely that such factual circumstances will 
ever exist, it is not conceptually impossible. The fact remains that 
rigid deontology allows the bombs to go off in that scenario, 
however unlikely. Deontologists allow the world to explode to 
avoid violating the rights of a single individual. 
83 Matthews provides the following example: 
(1) If there are little green men from Mars, they are dictating war plans 
to the current administration. 
(2) There are green little men from Mars. 
(3) Therefore, they are dictating war plans to the current 
administration. 
If (1) and (2) are true, we must accept (3). But no one accepts (1) and (2). 
In the same way, the ticking time bomb hypothetical merely asserts that if a 
certain set of premises are true, we must arrive at a conclusion. But until we can 
accept the ticking time bomb hypothetical's premises, it has no argumentative 
force. 
84 The hypothetical also assumes a single, ad hoc decision made by one 
individual. In the real world, we decide the most appropriate policy choice or 
protocol for a complicated administrative agency. See MATTHEWS, supra note 
13, at 22; Luban, supra note 4, at 1445. Because multiple people in an agency 
must make independent decisions, there is greater opportunity for error. 
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B. Deontology's Comparison of Torture and Legal Killing 
1. The Argument Relies on a Disputed Premise 
The argument that torture ought to be permissible because 
some forms of killing are permissible relies on a premise that 
deontologists reject. The argument's syllogism contains a hidden 
premise between steps (4) and (5). It assumes that moral 
permissibility turns on the quantum of harm visited upon victims, 
asserting that "whenever a greater harm is permissible, a lesser 
harm must also be permissible." It follows modus ponens: a greater 
harm (killing) is permissible, therefore the lesser harm (torture) 
should also be permissible. Without this hidden premise, the 
ultimate conclusion—that torture should be permissible on account 
of just war killing's permissibility—does not follow. A more 
accurate second stage of the syllogism would read: 
B. Since (4) just-combat killing is a greater harm 
than torture usually is, and 
(*) whenever a greater harm is permissible, 
a lesser harm must also be permissible, 
(5) just-combat killing is sometimes 
morally permissible, 
then (6) torture ought to be sometimes morally 
permissible. 
Deontologists reject the hidden premise. Rather than simply 
comparing the relative consequences of actions, many 
deontologists first determine whether an act violates someone's 
rights. Because deontologists constrain consequentialist reasoning 
in this way, acts that produce lesser harms may be impermissible 
while acts that produce greater harms may be permissible. Thus, 
because of the concern for the victim's rights, it does not follow 
that a lesser harm is permissible simply because a greater harm is 
permissible. Deontologists remain unscathed by this objection. 
Even without turning to the objection's syllogism, evaluating 
the strengths and weaknesses of deontology reveals that this 
objection cannot affect their position. The ticking time bomb 
hypothetical exposes the position's biggest problem: adherence to 
unconditional prohibition of torture might allow mass death. But 
many deontologists brush off this criticism and point out that 
fashioning moral rules involves more than simply comparing 
relative consequences. Given this refusal to yield to the ticking 
time bomb hypothetical and compare the consequences of torture 
and mass destruction, it seems silly to think that deontologists 
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would permit torture simply because it produces less harmful 
consequences than legally permissible acts. 
2. Killing and Torture Are Distinguishable 
Applying the moral criteria that deontologists accept, torture 
can be distinguished from legalized killings. As argued above, 
deontologists reject the hidden premise and claim that the 
objection fails to undermine their argument for unconditional 
prohibition of torture. But refuting one objection does not 
necessarily prove their position. Deontologists must still justify a 
legal regime that accepts certain killings and forbids torture. They 
must distinguish torture from just war, capital punishment, and the 
killing of fleeing suspects. When deontologists analyze the act of 
torture, the analysis reveals that the nature of the interaction 
between the perpetrator and victim differs substantially from that 
of state-sanctioned killings. First, unlike just war killings and 
killing fleeing suspects, torture is an assault on the defenseless. 
Second, unlike nearly any other physical assault, torture 
specifically targets the victim's dignity. 
As Henry Shue famously pointed out, torture attacks the 
defenseless.8' One of the most basic principles incorporated in the 
law of war is the distinction between combatants and 
noncombatants.86 Not only does this rule minimize destruction by 
limiting the pool of people assaulted, but it differentiates the type 
of acceptable casualties. 57 Ordinarily in war, at the instant of death, 
both the killer and the victim could kill each other; each serves as a 
threat to the other until someone dies. In contrast, in torture, it is 
not a "fair fight."88 The torture victim no longer serves as a threat; 
he is captured and detained. 
Admittedly, this conception of both war and torture 
oversimplifies matters. The torture victim, while obviously not a 
direct threat in the sense that he might fight back, supposedly 
possesses information that can relieve a significant threat. In the 
same way that killing a combatant on the battlefield dispels a 
threat, torturing to extract information also relieves a threat. 
Further, it is possible to conceive the torture victim as not having 
surrendered until he discloses the relevant information. 
85 Shue, Torture, supra note 9, at 124. 
86 Id. at 127; accord Bellamy, supra note 8, at 140; Levinson, supra note 8, at 
2034-37. 
87 Shue, Torture, supra note 9, at 128. 
88 Id. at 129. 
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Nevertheless, the torture victim remains defenseless in many 
important respects. First, the torture victim who is truly committed 
to his cause will not disclose the information.89 Compliance means 
betrayal and betrayal, particularly self-betrayal, cannot be 
conceived as a meaningful escape." Second, unlike in battle, the 
torture victim cannot shield himself or retaliate in any way not 
already set in motion before capture.91 The torture victim has no 
prospect of surprising the tormentor.92 Indeed, torture victims are 
utterly at the mercy of the torturer.93 Third, in addition to being 
physically defenseless, the torture victim cannot resist legally or 
morally.94 
Second, torture specifically targets the victim's dignity.95  
While killing destroys the entire person, it at least keeps the 
victim's dignity intact." Torture, on the other hand, specifically 
targets humanity and autonomy.97 Torture intentionally inflicts 
torment in ways that force the victim to use his own agency against 
himself.98 Through the deliberate and calculated infliction of pain, 
torture seeks to undermine "the very capacities constitutive of 
autonomous agency itself." 99 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Both rule utilitarians and deontologists successfully distinguish 
between torture and legal killings and defend themselves against 
charges of hypocrisy and inconsistency. Rule utilitarians argue that 
inherent interpretive barriers make unnecessary torture inevitable, 
while no such obstacles plague interpretation of legal killings. 
Unlike most utilitarian arguments, which are empirical in nature, 
this argument relies on innate conceptual difficulties not subject to 
89 1d. at 135-37. 
" Id.; accord Sussman, supra note 8, at 18. 
91 Id. at 6. 
92 id. 
93 Id. 
94 14  
95 See MATTHEWS, supra note 13, at 46-59. 
96 The intentionality of torture also differs from killings. First, while one can 
accidentally kill, accidental torture is impossible. See Sussman, supra note 8, at 
5. Second, assuming a just war, any collateral deaths are unintentional. See 
Levinson, supra note 8, at 2036. Third, while we ordinarily recognize the right 
to kill in self-defense, the right to torture in self-defense seems nonsensical. See 
Sussman, supra note 8, at 15. 
97 Id. at 13. 
98 Id. at 14. 
99 Id. 
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mutable factual realities. Deontologists maintain that analogizing 
torture and state-sanctioned killings fails because deontologists do 
not simply compare consequences when evaluating moral actions. 
Using the criteria they accept, they distinguish torture because it 
attacks the defenseless and specifically targets human dignity. 
However, merely distinguishing torturing and killing does not 
defend unconditional prohibition of torture. Whether unconditional 
prohibition of torture is justifiable and whether torturing and 
killing can be distinguished are distinct questions. This Note only 
provides analysis of the latter inquiry, a mere piece of the puzzle in 
the broader torture debate. In its defense, this Note identifies many 
of the strongest arguments supporting rule utilitarians and 
deontologists. It also provides analysis that may eliminate a subset 
of the debate. 
Three questions remain unanswered. First, how do utilitarians 
and deontologists survive attacks from each other? This Note 
addresses how each group perceives and overcomes challenges of 
hypocrisy using the analytical tools of their respective moral 
theories. For the most part, it overlooks the meta-ethical problems 
in deciding the more appropriate moral theory between the two. 
Second, how do these theories compare to other permutations of 
consequentialism and deontology? For example, some 
philosophers support "threshold deontology," in which potential 
catastrophes trigger consequentialist considerations:13° Finally, 
how do these theories compare to the various extra-legal solutions 
to the problem? Philosophers and jurists have argued for judicial 
warrants,101 civil disobedience,1°2 ex-post ratification,103 necessity 
defenses,1°4 and necessity excuses. 
lw See Kutz, supra note 73, at 255; Sen, supra note 12, at 187-223; Posner & 
Vermeule, supra note 6, at 677. 
lol ALAN DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE 
THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE (2002). 
102 See e.g., Gross, supra note 17. 
103 See e.g., id. at 1526-34. 
104 See e.g., Thomas Crocker, Overcoming Necessity: Torture and the State of 
Constitutional Torture, 61 SMU L. REV. 221 (2008); Paolo Gaeta, May 
Necessity Be Available as a Defense for Torture in the Interrogation of 
Suspected Torturers?, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 785 (2004); Moore, supra note 12. 
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